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This study utilises payment system data to analyse market participants’ liquidity 
usage and to trace interest rates paid on overnight loans. Our aim is to examine 
how liquidity usage has changed during the years 2006–2/2011 and to combine 
this information with data on overnight lending rates between market participants. 
It turns out that the Furfine algorithm used in the analysis produces overnight 
interest rates that correlate very closely with the EONIA curve. Based on Finnish 
payment system data, we identify four separate time periods: normal, start of 
turmoil, acute crisis and stabilizing period. The results show that, during the acute 
crisis period, TARGET2 participants holding an account with the Bank of Finland 
paid, on average, lower overnight interest rates than other banks in the euro area. 
However, the results reveal there has been some lack of confidence between 
Finnish participants since the onset of the financial crisis. A new indicator – the 
Grid – which we present here shows this very clearly. We suggest that this new 
indicator could be a highly useful tool for overseers in supporting financial 
stability analysis. 
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Indikaattori likviditeetinkäytön ja yön yli -lainauksen 
seurantaan 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 23/2011 
Tatu Laine – Tuomas Nummelin – Heli Snellman 




Tässä selvityksessä analysoidaan markkinaosapuolten likviditeetinhallintaa ja va-
kuudettomien yön yli -lainojen hinnoittelua maksujärjestelmädatan avulla. Tavoit-
teenamme on selvittää muutoksia osapuolten likviditeetinkäytössä vuodesta 2006 
helmikuun 2011 loppuun sekä yhdistää tämä tieto osapuolten toisilleen maksamiin 
yön yli -lainojen korkoihin. Analyysissa käytetty Furfine-algoritmi näyttäisi jäljit-
tävän yön yli -lainoista maksetut korot maksutapahtuma-aineistosta, sillä algorit-
min avulla saatu korkokuvaaja korreloi hyvin eoniakoron kuvaajan kanssa. Suo-
men maksujärjestelmädatan perusteella tarkastelujakso voidaan jakaa neljään 
osaan: normaaliaika, kriisiä edeltävä aika, kriisin aika ja tasaantumisen aika. 
Tulosten mukaan Suomen Pankin kautta TARGET2-järjestelmään osallistuvat 
pankit maksoivat kriisin aikana alhaisempaa korkoa yön yli -lainoista kuin euro-
alueen pankit keskimäärin. Tässä työssä esiteltävä indikaattori kuitenkin paljastaa, 
että myös suomalaisten osapuolten kesken näyttäisi olleen luottamuspulaa kriisin 
alettua. Indikaattori voisi olla hyödyllinen lisätyökalu yleisvalvojille rahoitus-
markkinoiden vakausanalyysia tukevassa työssä. 
 
Avainsanat: likviditeetti, korot, yön yli -lainat, maksujärjestelmät, indikaattorit 
 
JEL-luokittelu: C81, E42, E43, E58  
5 
Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... 3 
Tiivistelmä (abstract in Finnish) .............................................................................. 4 
 
1 Introduction  ......................................................................................................  7 
 
2 Analysis  .............................................................................................................  8 
 2.1  Literature  review  ........................................................................................  8 
 2.2  Liquidity  usage  ..........................................................................................  9 
  2.3  Interest rates on overnight loans .............................................................. 11 
 
3 Indicator  ..........................................................................................................  15 
 3.1  General  indicator  .....................................................................................  15 
 3.2  Time  behavior  ..........................................................................................  17 
 3.3  Further  steps  ............................................................................................  18 
 
4 Conclusions  .....................................................................................................  19 
 











1  Introduction 
The payment system data include a wealth of  information on market participants’ behavior. 
The financial crisis has highlighted the need to better utilise also the data of payment systems 
in support of financial stability analysis. TA RGET2 – the RTGS system owned and operated 
by the Eurosystem – provides real-time processing and settlement in central bank money. The 
data  on payment  transactions in TARGET2 coul d  be used m ore  effectively  for oversight 
purposes, for instance to reveal potential problems of counterparties.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the  usage of liquidity by TARGET2 participants 
holding an account with the Bank of Finland. In addition, we analyze the interest rates paid by 
one financial institution to an other for overnight credit. The aim is to com bine these two 
pieces  of infor mation  in building   an ind icator.  Ideally,  this  indicator  would  be used in 
everyday oversight work, in order to immediately observe changes in a participant's behavior. 
Such  an indicator would provide infor mation  from  two independent sources, nam ely  the 
central bank and individual participants in  the interbank money market. The central bank can 
observe  participants'  accounts and liquidity  usage  in TARGET2, which information is 
otherwise  known  only to each p articipant.  Participants  see changes in   other p articipants’ 
behavior, if payment transactions are not received on tim e. However, banks m ake real time 
assumptions about each others'  financial situation, as the interbank money m arket is highly 
integrated. If a participant assumes that another participant is running into trouble, the former 
is first supposed to raise the interest rate on  overnight credit. If risks are assum ed  to be 
excessive, the participant is supposed to end its lending to the problem participant.  
As stated above, this paper aims to combine earlier ideas into a single easy-to-use tool for 
everyday oversight work.
1 A further motivation is that inte rest rates on overnight loans have 
previously been studied using eg US and Dutch data but not Finnish data.   
The  results of our study indicate that the ove rnight  loan interest  rates  combined  with 
liquidity  usage by m arket  participants provides an indica tor  that co uld  reveal whether a 
market  participant is potentially in trouble.  The  crucial points here are that the data are 
                                                  
1 The basic idea was presented in the Bank of Finland Bulletin: Financial Stability 2010 (Bank of Finland, 2010). 8 
 
analyzed on a daily basis and that the indicator is calibrated based on historical payment data. 
These are the next steps that should be taken.   
 
2  Analysis 
The analysis Section is divided into three parts. A brief literature review is given in 2.1. Part 
2.2 describes how m arket participants’ daily liquidity usage can  be used to build the Forest 
Fire diagram. Part 2.3 describes how interest rates on overnight loans can be used to study the 
confidence of the market participants in each other.  
 
2.1  Literature review 
Liquidity  usage has been illustrated by Forest  Fire  diagram  in this p aper.  This idea was  
inspired by Capel et al. (2009)  who presented the idea in  the Bank of Finland Sim ulator 
Seminar  in 2009. Furtherm ore,  Heijmans  and Heuver (20 11)  illustrated  collateral use for  
intraday credit by using a similar diagram. 
The other part of the indicator, namely interest  rates paid on overnight credits, has been 
discussed in the literature of the last decade.  Furfine (1999) developed an algorithm to trace 
transactions  related to   overnight loans and Dem iralp  et  al. (2004) further developed the 
algorithm for selecting candidate loan transactions. Recently, Heijmans et al. (2010) improved 
the algorithm for identifying loans of maturities up to one year, in addition to overnight loans. 
Heijmans et al. (2010) show how spreads and vol atility of interest rates on interbank loans 
increased  during the financial crisis. Furt hermore,  Akram and Chr istophersen  (2010) 
discussed overnight interest rates based on Norwegian data. They concluded that interest rates 
on overnight loans vary across banks and over time. In contrast, Eklund (2009) concluded that 
in Sweden the majority of overnight loans are made without a risk premium.  
 9 
 
2.2  Liquidity usage 
Liquidity management differs across participants in the TARGET2-Suomen Pankki system
2. 
In this paper, liquidity refers to m oney in a participant's central bank account and to the 
collateralized overdraft facility of the account, which can be used imm ediately as intraday 
credit,  when needed.   The difference between  the  start-of-day balance and the m inimum 
balance for the day is divided by the sum of the start-of-day balance and the available intraday 
credit, as shown below: 
 
                 %   
                                        
                                        
 
 
This results in maximum usage of liquidity by the participant
3. Some of the participants 
may actively manage their liquidity and extens ively use intraday central bank credit. Som e 
others may hold large deposits  on their central bank accounts, in  order to assure the sm ooth 
execution of payments and to avoid credit.  High usage of liquidity, as opposed to active 
liquidity  management,  may  also indicate pr oblems  for  the participant in m eeting  its 
obligations.  
Figure 1 illustrates liquidity usage of partic ipants. The green area indicates participan ts 
using up to 30% of their liquidity and the black area indicates usage in excess of 90%. We see 
that in year 2006, ie before the financial crisis, mo re than one half of the participants used at 
most 30% of the liquidity. The green area shrunk after the start of 2007 and was at its smallest 
in 2009. The share of participants in the black  area has been fairly stable, and less than 10% 
of participants have used over 90% of their liq uidity. However, this share was slightly higher 
during 2007. 
                                                  
2 TARGET2-Suomen Pankki system was launched on 18 February 2008, and it is part of TARGET2. We have used for the analysis the data 
of TARGET2-Suomen Pankki system and the data of its predecessor BoF-RTGS system. 
3 The information on the value of additional eligible collateral pledged with the Bank of Finland could be added to the comparison, but these 
data were not available for this study. 10 
 
Problems in the US housing loan market esca lated in August 2007 (at  the start of turmoil 
period
4). In September 2008, US mortgage banks  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken 
over by the federal governm ent and Lehman Brothers went bankrupt  (eg Bank of Finland, 
2008). In this paper, this was defined as the start of the acute crisis period. As Figure 1 shows, 
the red, orange and yellow areas expanded afte r 2008Q3, which indicates that a bigger share 
of participants then used over 30% of thei r liquidity. Towards the end of 2009, the diagram 
shows  that the liquid ity  usage  is  at the   same  level as du ring  the  start  of  turmoil  period. 
However, since end-2010 the share  of participants using less than 30% of their liquidity has 
been decreasing. This could indicate the forthcoming second turbulent period. Figure 1 shows 
the aggregate liquidity usage by participants, but for oversight purposes the liquidity usage of 
each participant could also be analyzed. 
 
Figure 1. Liquidity usage by TARGET2-Suomen Pankki participants. 
  
                                                  
4 In this paper, we have divided the five years into four periods: A) the normal period before the financial crisis (1.1.2006–30.6.2007), B) the 
start of turmoil period (1.7.2007–14.9.2008), C) the acute crisis period (15.9.2008–30.6.2009) and D) the stabilizing period (1.7.2009–
28.2.2011). 11 
 
2.3  Interest rates on overnight loans 
Normally, banks even out their liquidity fluctuations in the interbank money  markets. If a 
bank pays a higher interest rate on overnight loan s than others, this could indicate som e lack 
of confidence. Furthermore, if there are notable changes in the level of interest rates paid by a 
bank compared to its own history, this could be  an important signal, if interest rates paid by 
other counterparties remain steady. Information on interest rates on ov ernight credit is not 
readily available. However, interes t rates can be estimated from payment systems data. We 
assume that loans and refunds take place in the same system.  
In this study, we concentrate on overnight  loans and do not analyze longer m aturities. 
According to the results of Heijmans et al. (2010), over 80% of the va lue of interbank loan 
transactions  was f or  overnight  loans.  Also in   bilateral  discussions  with Finn ish  financial 
institutions, the participants have indicated that they m ainly lend and borrow m oney from 
interbank  markets  on an overnight basis. Lo nger-term  loans have rem arkably  decreased 
during the financial crisis. In this analysis, we concentrate on borrower-participants.  
In bilateral discussions with financial institutions we have also found out the procedure for 
granting overnight loans (see F igure 2). Generally, the participants m ake deals before lunch 
time, after which the transactions are handled in the back-office and then executed in the 
payment system. Overnight loans of  the previous day have to be paid back before granting 
new credit. The participants have a common un derstanding on the proc edures of overnight 
loans. If a participant does not follow the unwritten rules, this may increase mistrust among 
other participants.  12 
 
Figure 2. Borrowing (left bars, green) and refunding  (right bars, blue) numbers of overnight 
loans  have different distributi ons  over the business day. The  light  color  (bottom  of  bar) 
indicates year 2006 and the dark color (top of bar) 2010. 
 
 
Following Furfine (1999), we search for transactions paid eg on Monday by bank A to bank B 
and refunded on Tuesday by bank B  to bank A at interest rate r. The analysis is based on the 
actual data on TARGET2-Suom en Pankki transactions. Furfine (1999) used only paym ents 
larger than $1 million ending in five zeros whereas we included all transactions over EUR 10 
000  ending in four zeros. Based on the discussi ons  with m arket  participants,  the refund 
typically includes both principal and interest. Th erefore, we assumed that loans are refunded 
on the next day and that these transactions incl ude the original principal and the interest. In 
case of many matches, the first possible transaction pair was identified as the loan and refund 
(see eg Heijmans et al. (2010)). The weighted average interest rate (FEONIA) was calculated 
from these found principal-interest rate pairs. Comparing FEONIA with EONIA indicates that 
these two interest rates follow each other very closely (F igure 3). In other words, the interest 
rate found on the basis of the Furfi ne (1999) method seems to work well. Quality of fitting 
can be described eg by the R
2 statistic, which is close to 1.  13 
 
Figure 3. FEONIA (Finnish EONIA; red line) and  EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average; 
blue line). 
 
During normal times, interest rates paid by counterparties seem to be highly concentrated and 
equal. Figure 4 is based on the daily data wher e interest rate paid by e ach participant was 
subtracted from EONIA. The spread between minimum and maximum values is shown, and 
from Figure 4 we can see that the interest rates paid by counterparties vary much more during 
the acute crisis period. This i ndicates that some counterpartie s have to pay higher interest 
rates because other counterparties have judged that the risks relating to those particular banks 
have increased.  Figure 4 includes the data of  participants in TA RGET2-Suomen Pankki as 
well  as the data on their tran sactions  with other TARGET2  counterparties.  If the RTGS 
accounts of foreign participants are excluded, the data describing the pure Finnish market are 
concentrated  in the dark area. Th is  means that  banks participating in TARGET2-Suo men 
Pankki could have had overnight loans from  the home market with lower interest rates than 
from abroad during the f inancial crisis. This indicates that domestic market participants had 
more confidence in each other than in foreign banks. It seems that TARGET2-Suomen Pankki 14 
 
participants pay lower interest rates on average than other T ARGET2 counterparties after the 
acute crisis period. 
 
Figure 4. Spread between minimum and maximum of the difference curve (EONIA - interest 
rate paid by each participant for overnight credit). 50% of observations are concentrated in the
dark area. 
 
Single peaks were not smoothed out from  the raw data of Figure 4. Most of the single peaks 
are false principle-interest findings
5 from the raw data, but if all of them  are mechanically 
smoothed out, also the im portant change might not be observed. Here,  particular days and 
participants were not reported, for the sake  of anonymity. For oversight purposes, potentially 
stressed participants could be identified and monitored. 
                                                  
5 Type 1 errors, ie some transactions are classified as overnight interbank loans even if they are not such transactions. See eg Heijmans et al. 
(2010). 15 
 
3  Indicator 
In this Section, we first present the general id ea of the indicator. In part 3.2, we choose the 
two  most  interesting participants and c onduct  further analysis  by  including the tim e 
dimension. Further steps are discussed in part 3.3. 
 
3.1  General indicator 
The  next step is to co mbine  the inf ormation  on liquid ity  usage and   on inter est  rates o n 
overnight credit. In more concrete terms, these two parts of the indicator can be included in 
the same plot; see Figure 5. In Figure 5, the average interest rate difference (EONIA - interest 
rate paid by each participant for overnight cr edit) calculated over about five calendar years 
(2006–2/2011) is shown as a function of the av erage liquidity usage f or the eight biggest 
participants  in TARGET2-Suom en  Pankki syst em.  From  the figure we observe that the 
average liquidity usage varies from 25% to 73% and the average  interest rate difference from 
0.0028% to 0.1366%. The higher average  interest rate difference indicates that the bank pays 
less for overnight credit.
6 From Figure 5 we see that the red dot (bank A) best m anages its 
position. Bank A does not keep t oo much excess liquidity in the paym ent system and, on the 
other hand, it can get overnight loans at lower interest rate than the others. The orange square 
(bank B) has alm ost the same average liquidity usage level as Bank A, but it pays higher 
interest for overnight loans. Bank B could we ll deserve closer examination. The yellow dot  
(bank C) can also get cheap overnight loans, but  its liquidity usage is not  as efficient as for 
Bank A. The other banks stay in the neutral central zone. Their average liquidity usage varies 
from 25% to 67% and average interest rate difference from 0.0482% to 0.0651%.  
                                                  
6 Generally, the Finnish overnight loan interest rates are lower than EONIA. 16 
 
Figure 5. A proposed indicator; the average interest rate difference is shown as a function o f
average liquidity usage. Now the total area is di vided into fifteen blocks. A high interest rate
difference combined with high liquidity usag e indicates that a pa rticipant has a good an d
healthy position. A low interest rate differen ce combined with high liquidity usage indicates
that a participant may be more stressed. Error bars indicate the area containing two-thirds o f 
data points. 
 
In the Finnish case, Figure 5 could be the baseline for the indicator. By defining the blue and 
green lines, we can divide the to tal area into subareas. In this example, blue lines define five 
liquidity slices (0–30%, 30–50%, 50–70%, 70–90%, 90–100%) and green lines three average 
interest rate difference slices (-0.02–0.04%, 0.04–0.10%, 0.10–0.16%). Altogether we have a 
grid of fifteen panels containing the particip ants. Since we do not have had any major bank 
defaulting in Finland, the large negative average interest rate difference values are missing. If 
a participant were in trouble, it would pay high interest on ov ernight loans and it would end 
up in the below -0.02% level in Fig ure 5. Also this same defaulting participant would have 
high average liquidity usage, probably above the 90% level. 
 17 
 
3.2  Time behavior 
When building the general indicator in part 3.1  we found out that two pa rticipants should be 
further analyzed. We decided to  divide the five years  into four periods, as Heijmans et al. 
(2010) suggested in their work.  
Figure 6 shows how the proposed indicator deve lops over time. The four points refer to 
time  periods as follows: A) the norm al  period before the financial crisis (1.1.2006–
30.6.2007), B) the start of turm oil period (1.7.2007–14.9.2008), C) the acute  crisis period 
(15.9.2008–30.6.2009) and the D) the stabilizing period (1.7.2009–28.2.2011). From Figure 6 
we see that two particip ants (dot and square) are very close to each oth er during the normal 
(A) and start of tur moil (B) periods. The partic ipants move in opposite directions w hen the 
start of turmoil mode (B) turns to the acute crisis mode (C). Finally, the participants end up in 
different stabilizing period states (D ). This means that the other m oney market participants 
have re-evaluated the creditability of these two participants. The dot participant is in a better 
position than the square particip ant after the turbulent period.  The next step would be to 
monitor  these  two p articipants  on  a daily ba sis  to see whether the disparity vanishes or 
continues to grow over time.    18 
 
Figure 6. An example of how the proposed indicator drifts over time. The indicator is shown 
for  two participants (dot and  square)  who m ove  in opposite directions when the start of  
turmoil mode (B) turns to the acute crisis m ode (C). The m oney market participants have 
greater confidence in participant dot than in  participant square. (D) describes the stabilizing 
period state; the disparity of the two participants is clearly visible from the graph. 
 
 
3.3  Further steps 
To summarize, if the participant has to pay a hi gh interest rate on overnight credit and, at the 
same time, has used almost all of its liquidit y, this participant may be running into problems. 
Such observable change in behavior could guide an overseer or supervisory authority to take a 
closer look at the participant's behavior. 
The crucial points are th e calibrations of the indicator ie the Grid. In  practice, this would 
mean studying in greater detail the historical payment data from 2006 to the present. The key 
question is which of the peaks in Figure 4 are  true alarms and which are not. Part of the 
calibration procedure is how to choose tim e windows (eg daily, monthly, yearly average) for 
the data point in the Grid. The next step would be to bring the data processing more into real 19 
 
time. Each day, we should be able to calculate the indicator value on the basis of the previous 
day’s data.  
 
4  Conclusions 
This work was inspired by the idea that  information on TARGET2-Suomen Pankki payment 
system participants’ liquidity usage could be combined with information on interest rates paid 
on their overnight loans. This Finnish exam ple shows that there are observable differences 
between the ways in which partic ipants manage their liquidity positions and how much they 
pay for overnight credit. Since there have been  no major participant defaults in Finland, the 
results only indicate that some market participants do better than others, but that no one is in a 
serious trouble.  
The next step could be to br oaden the scope of this same exercise, eg to the 15–20 largest 
banks in the euro area. First, we should define the baseline period and block sizes for the Grid 
based on the historical data, which is not neces sarily straightforward during abnormal times. 
The second step would be to  detect and analyze the movements of participants within the 
Grid. The challenge here is to be able to calibr ate the Grid smartly and to f ilter the single 
peaks, the false alarms, out of the raw data. If the filtering is too intensive, then there is a risk 
that  also some  significant sudden changes  will  be excluded. Obviously, Eurosystem non-
standard monetary policy measures, like fixed-rate full-allotment procedures, have effect on 
the calibration of the Grid. In su ch a situation, participants may borrow more money from 
central banks, instead of interbank market.  
Using the indicator also poses a challenge for the data management process, as data should 
be available on a close-to-real-time basis. In the best case, the today’s indicator value would 
be calculated on the basis of yesterday’s data. 
In sum, we find this indicator to be a potentially highly useful tool for overseers to support 
the financial stability analysis. The more data from various sources are combined, the more 
knowledge we can obtain. Stock prices and collateral volumes could be next in line for adding 
to the indicator presented here.   
  20 
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